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Abstract. Digital identity management (IdM) for citizen-life processes requires 
trusted relationship among the service providers and users. Current IdM sys-
tems tend to lack the trust component in particular for online transactions. We 
propose the use of ePassport as a globally interoperable trust token to bridge the 
gap between offline and online environments. The paper analyses trust attrib-
utes of the ePassport and recognizes the extensions required to its deployment 
in an online IdM for high-value transactions. An architecture is proposed for a 
network-based IdM system to support three categories of life processes: eGov-
ernment services, high value private services, and eCommerce. The solution is 
compatible with privacy-enhancing technologies while at the same time creat-
ing trusted digital identities and offering users convenience. 
Keywords: identity management, online services, trusted identity, privacy. 
1   Introduction 
Citizens engage in a variety of life processes, managed by public and private sectors, 
where there is need to provide a proof of identity to participate in the process. In some 
cases the proof of identity is required only once, in other cases it may be asked re-
peatedly. Examples of such processes are: banking, social security, international 
travel, staying in hotels, high-value purchases, car rental, use of credit card, joining 
private clubs, admission to a school or university, seeking employment, health ser-
vices, etc.  
There are numerous types of identity documents: national identity card, passports, 
social security card, health insurance card, employer’s card, banker’s card, driving 
license, etc. Most of the identity documents, with the exception of the national iden-
tity card, are function-specific and context-dependent, even though in practice they 
may be accepted in other contexts.  
The kind of identity-related information offered by identity documents also varies: 
ranging from facial identity linked to the name of a person, it may also include signa-
tures, date of birth, address, citizenship, medical information, and other personal and 
biographic data. With the advent of smart cards in the past decade, the ambition of 
storing a variety of information has suddenly taken a leap. The idea of a multi-
function identity card has been mooted but reservations remain due to the privacy 
risks involved. 
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Passports are official identity documents intended to facilitate international travel 
of citizens. However, due to their official status and universality passports are also 
used and accepted as identity documents with photo-Id in various citizen-based proc-
esses other than travel. This is particularly true in the countries where national iden-
tity cards are not mandatory, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom.   
Electronic passports (or, ePassports) were introduced in the EU in August 2006 as 
a means of strong authentication for border control. The ePassports store certain bio-
metric data of the bearer on a chip embedded within the passport booklet.  In the EU, 
the biometric data stored on the chip is digital image of the face and from mid-2009, it 
will also include the fingerprint.  
Only authorized readers at EU border control points can access the fingerprint im-
age stored on the chip whereas the facial image and biographical data may be read by 
any ePassport reader available commercially. With the diffusion of ePassports and 
related technology, it is quite feasible that in the near future various citizen-service 
outlets will be equipped with the devices to read and store the biographical data and 
facial biometric. 
In face-to-face interaction, the printed biographic data page of the ePassport can 
still be used as a photo-Id like the traditional passport. However, to provide a function 
for network-based identity, it needs to be augmented so that a whole range of trust-
based services may be offered in a convenient and uniform manner. This will avoid 
the need to create a separate electronic identity, detached from the physical realm. 
The idea of using governmental tokens as the basis for identity services has been 
investigated in some countries, with the recent introduction of eIDs. Questions have 
been raised if eIDs are more appropriate tokens for eCommerce in comparison to 
ePassport with privacy issues already pointed out.  
This paper investigates key issues of trust in a network-based identity infrastruc-
ture based on ePassports. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of trust mechanisms in the ePassport infrastructure. In Section 3 we exam-
ine key approaches to network-based IdM and identify key requirements for a net-
work-based IdM system. In Section 4 we propose an IdM architecture for deploying 
ePassports in network-based citizen-life processes characterized by varying degree of 
risk. We conclude with a discussion of key challenges in Section 5. 
2   Trust Mechanisms in the ePassport Infrastructure 
There are two types of definition of trust one is social/legislative and the other type is 
quantitative/mathematical. So the definitions for trust of the first type refer to qualities 
[11] that the trusted party should possess: 
• predictability of the trusted party, 
• completion of transactions even in the absence of full knowledge, 
• immediate payback of any type is not a strict requirement,        
• exposed vulnerabilities are not exploited, 
• reputation 
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Table 1. Trust relationships and constraints in ePassport infrastructure 
Roles & Constraints Infrastructure 
Perspective Passport Holder Issuing State Border Control Post 
IdM role principal identity provider service provider 
Trust relationship 
boot up. 
Provides pre-requisites 
(e.g. feeder documents 
on his identity) to the 
issuing authorities. 
Establishes the pre-
requisites to the trust 
relationship with the 
principal. 
Establishes the pre-
requisites to the trust 
relationship with the 
issuing authorities. 
Legacy function. Presents the passport as 
a traditional booklet to 
authenticate himself. 
Doesn’t know how the 
scanned MRZ data is 
used, shared and 
retained. 
Provides identity through 
a photo and biographic 
data on a printed page. 
Uses the visual 
inspection means to 
check the authenticity of 
the passport and match 
the printed photo with 
the live subject. 
BAC  minimum 
scope. 
In addition to the 
printed biographical 
data, also provides 
primary biometrics1 
(live facial image) to 
authenticate himself. 
Agrees tacitly to allow 
access his biometric 
data for the purpose of 
border control. 
 
Provides facial biometric 
on a contactless smartcard 
chip, embedded in the 
passport booklet. Permits 
passive authentication to 
anyone with a suitable 
ePassport reader. 
Through ICAO 
membership, implicitly 
authorizes other ICAO 
members right to read 
their chips. 
Uses the MRZ data on 
the printed page to 
enable access to the 
facial biometric on chip. 
May use visual means or 
image recognition to do 
the match between the 
facial biometric and the 
subject. 
BAC  max scope. No additional action 
required. 
Separately provides a 
digital certificate to 
authorized service 
providers for active 
authentication of chip 
data. These digital 
certificates are not highly 
protected. 
Global scope – Needs 
certificate of the issuing 
country to authenticate 
the validity of data on 
the ePassport chip. 
EAC. Also provides his 
secondary biometrics 
(fingerprints) to 
authenticate himself. 
Agrees tacitly to allow 
access his biometric 
data for the purpose of 
border control. 
Provides certificates in a 
hierarchy of identity 
providers and service 
providers. Explicit 
authorization provided 
only to other EU 
countries.  
Terminal authentication 
needed: Requires 
terminals with explicit 
authority from identity 
providers via secret 
cryptographic keys to 
enable reading of the 
secondary biometrics. 
Organizational 
model. 
National passports / 
travel documents are 
recognized 
internationally as 
trusted credentials for 
identity. 
National passport issuers 
as identity providers; 
implicit authorization to 
all ICAO states for BAC 
level trust; explicit 
authorization to the other 
EU States for EAC level 
trust. 
No specific steps are 
required to operate at 
BAC level; at EAC level, 
the protection of private 
cryptographic keys is a 
major responsibility. 
Mutual recognition of 
passports as trusted 
identity. 
 
                                                          
1
 According to the EU passport specification [9] ace is the primary biometric, fingerprint and 
iris are secondary. 
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In the quantitative models of trust, a special category of logic representing belief is 
used as a base [12] and the trust levels are expressed in terms (e.g. high, medium, 
low) or in number scales (e.g. 1-5). 
The European ePassport infrastructure is specific to border control applications and 
is designed for wide-scale interoperability. It consists of two trust levels. Level 1 trust 
is built in a mechanism known as Basic Access Control (BAC) designed to offer 
global interoperability and specified by ICAO. Level 2 trust is built at an enhanced 
level, known as Extended Access Control (EAC) and is based on additional specifica-
tion for EU-wide interoperability. Trust in the context of border control can be  
defined between three parties: (a) principal – the entity holding the passport as an 
identity token; (b) identity provider – the passport issuing State; (c) the service  
provider – a border control post in the same or another State. Table 1 shows trust 
relationships and constraints between the three parties. 
As Table 1 shows, the ePassport infrastructure is based on federated trust. It has 
been developed on top of the legacy passport infrastructure. It grants right to access 
basic identity information to all ICAO members through the BAC mechanism.  
There is no explicit provision of privacy policy of the (border control) service pro-
viders nor is there option for privacy preferences by the holder. The basic as well as 
advanced functions of the ePassport (EAC and eVisa) assume implicit consent of the 
holder in all usages by service providers (i.e. the border control).  For advanced func-
tions, however, only a targeted subset of federation members are authorized to access 
privileged information (i.e. the secondary biometrics).   
However, ePassport infrastructure is designed for identity verification in face-to-
face mode.  Feasibility of its deployment in the networked environment will be  
examined in Section 4. 
3   Network-Based Identity Management  
3.1   Current Approaches 
Currently there are two main approaches to network-based identity management: 
centralized and distributed. In the centralized approach, a single entity acts as the 
identity provider (IdP) in the context of several service providers (SPs). The central-
ized IdP may offer an option to use pseudonyms as well as creating several service 
groups which require similar set of personal data. An example of centralized IdP is 
Microsoft Passport. In the decentralized approach several IdPs may form a federation 
mutually to recognize each other’s user sets as well as services. Examples of feder-
ated systems are Liberty Alliance and OpenID.  Whereas both of these approaches 
have put considerable emphasis on privacy protection and user convenience, neither 
of them is particularly strong in mandating trust mechanisms either on the part of the 
service providers or the end users. Instead they tend to rely on mechanisms such as 
reputation. Moreover, OpenID lacks the trust model and Liberty Alliance lacks an 
end-to-end implementation.  
Practical implementations of IdM by several commercial vendors are geared to-
wards large enterprises who would have various data services and a large number of 
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users spread around several locations and/or departments with different roles and 
privileges. This latter is generally termed as a Centralized Authentication Service 
(CAS). Although this last category is interesting in its own right due to its practical 
commercial relevance, it is not so much relevant for multi-organizational services 
directed to citizen-life processes, spanning eGov services, banking, healthcare, e-
shopping, education, edutainment and social networks.  
The proposed scenario assumes that both the IdPs and the SPs organizations are 
trustworthy and they follow the legislation regarding the personal data protection and 
they have clear privacy policies.   
For citizen-oriented services, in recent years there have been national initiatives to 
issue government-certified electronic identity (eID) e.g. in the form of X.509 certifi-
cates. Both card-based and file-based schemes have been proposed, however there is a 
lack of consensus on technical standards thus the interoperability remains a challenge 
[5][7]. Furthermore, in case of X.509 certificates, the certification authority needs the 
proof of identity at the time of issuance and since the certificates are possession based 
tokens, a loss of the storage medium would lead to the risk of impersonation or iden-
tity theft.  
3.2   Main Requirements of eID 
Whereas in face-to-face identity verification scenario human decision is often com-
bined with the technical mechanisms to deliver an acceptable degree of trust in the 
claimed identity, network-based identity verification needs to rely on technical means 
only. We identify the following requirements of digital identity management in rela-
tion to citizen-life processes for network-based interaction: 
(a) Trust 
a. Trusted credentials of the service providers 
b. Trust credentials of the identity provider 
c. Trusted credentials of the consumers (end users) 
(b) Privacy and data protection 
a. Data protection as required by law 
o By the IdP 
o By the SP 
b. Common Criteria[10] 
o Anonymity 
o Pseudonymity 
c. Data Avoidance[10]  
o Unlinkability 
o Unobservability  
(c) Security 
a. Communication security – confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation 
b. IdM infrastructure security 
c. Protection against identity fraud (protection of identity)  
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i. Authenticity of breeder documents (proof of identity at the 
time of  enrolment)  
ii. Binding between the user with trust credential at the time of 
authentication 
(d) Interoperability 
a. Between diverse identity providers 
b. Between identity providers and service providers 
c. Between the IdM system and the user environment (context) 
(e) Usability 
a. Ease of use 
b. Accessibility 
c. Efficiency 
d. Adaptable to widest range of users, use cases, life processes 
From a brief inspection of the above list, it becomes quite obvious that an IdM solu-
tion would have to make design trade-offs between the diverse requirements based on 
the priorities, cost, state of the art technology and scalability of alternative options for 
the underlying IdM architecture. Alternative solutions can still be evaluated in terms 
of the above requirements. 
3.3   Risk-Based Authentication 
In relation to security and trust, a key issue is the binding mechanism between the 
claimed identity and the claimant in a scheme. The strength of binding during authen-
tication should be appropriate enough to mitigate the risks involved in the transaction 
as well as the limitations or possible circumventions of different types of identity 
tokens (biometrics, digital certificates, password, etc). The scheme can be based on 
possession, knowledge or personal traits of the subject. NIST has proposed four lev-
els of authentication[13] which we extend as shown in Table 2. In many applications, 
multi-factor authentication may also be a practical option leading to a combination 
among password, biometric, hardware token and digital certificate. 
 
Table 2. Risk-based Authentication Options 
Au-
thenti-
cation 
Level 
Risk  
assessment 
by Service 
Provider 
Registration Policy of 
the Identity Provider 
Means of User 
Authentication  
Examples Primary 
Concern 
0 No risk – no 
damages 
No proof of identity 
required; self-
certification; unlimited 
period of enrolment 
None or Userid / 
password; 
password 
strength not 
enforced 
Chat rooms, 
email services; 
shopbot search; 
blog hosts 
Privacy; 
Usability 
1 Low – small 
damages 
Weak proof of identity: 
by referral of a trusted 
token or trusted 
identifier; implicit 
identity verification 
through an online 
payment gateway; 
unlimited fixed period 
of enrolment 
Userid / password 
password strength 
may be enforced; 
repeated  
authentication 
attempts blocked 
Online  
shopping;  
low-value 
social networks 
Data 
protection;  
usability; 
security  
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Au-
thenti-
cation 
Level 
Risk  
assessment 
by Service 
Provider 
Registration Policy of 
the Identity Provider 
Means of User 
Authentication  
Examples Primary 
Concern 
2 Medium – 
significant 
damages  
Remote enrolment 
accepted; online 
validation of identity; 
offline validation 
Periodic re-validation of 
identity and privileges 
Identity tokens 
(software or 
hardware); 
biometrics 
Online tax 
filing and other 
eGov services; 
high-value 
social networks 
Trust; 
Security;  
data 
protec-
tion; 
usability 
3 High – 
considerable 
damages 
Personal presence 
and/or verification of 
claimed identity 
through multiple 
sources; security 
vetting; periodic 
re-validation of identity 
and privileges 
Biometrics; 
hardware or 
software tokens; 
secure access;  
cards with hard 
crypto 
Banking; 
eHealth  
services; access 
to sensitive 
data 
Trust; 
security 
4 Very high – 
unacceptable 
level of 
damages  
Personal presence of the 
applicant is required; 
verification of breeder 
documents; security 
vetting; limited time 
enrolment; periodic 
re-validation of identity, 
privileges and security 
vetting 
Cards with hard 
crypto;  
multi-factor 
authentication; 
access to service 
only within 
supervised prem-
ises with physical 
access control; 
two-person 
authentication 
National  
security; 
commercial 
secrets; 
services for 
high-value 
persons 
Trust; 
security 
4   Proposed Architecture 
4.1   Federation of Trusted Identities 
As outlined in Section 3, the main requirements of a user-based IdM system are trust, 
privacy, security, interoperability and usability.  
We adopt the federated model where ePassport as the primary identity token to en-
sure trust and convenience whereas a SAML-2 based federation technology ensures 
security and interoperability [14].  
A separation of the identity providers from the service providers will in itself en-
hance privacy protection. User demand for privacy protection and the multi-vendor 
based competing solutions would further encourage adoption of the most powerful 
privacy-enhancing technologies by the identity providers and service providers. 
Figure 1 shows the proposed model where users are enroled with a trusted identity 
provider of their choice, based on trusted credentials. When using trusted networked 
services, the relevant identity provider verifies the user’s identity and furnishes the 
user information required for service provision. 
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Fig. 1. Federation of Trusted Identities based on common trust policy 
4.2   Services for Trusted Identities 
A trusted identity management architecture based on ePassport is proposed in Figure 
2. The diagram represents the use of the three main risk categories of services utiliz-
ing e-passport based identity verification.  
(a) Public / eGov services: For the government online services the IdP can use 
passport as a base document for identity enrolment. When providing entitled ser-
vices in a trusted kiosk-based environment, the ePassport can be used for real-
time biometric authentication.  In this case, the user is in control of his passport 
and the eGov service provider is in control of the trusted kiosk incorporating 
passport reader and biometric scanner (e.g. digital camera). Use of fingerprint is 
not foreseen for services unrelated to border control. Accessibility to the national 
passport database may not be needed if the kiosk can do the chip authentication. 
(b) High-value private services: Trusted organizations (banks, hospitals) offering 
high-value services often use own identity management, thus acting both as iden-
tity provider and service provider. However, this type of IdM can be simplified 
by deriving core identity from the ePassport and supplementing it with relevant 
demography data for health services and/or financial services. Registration would 
require the physical presence of the user. The identity provider will be responsi-
ble for releasing only the relevant data depending on the service requested. Facial 
biometric verification with ePassport as a reference token may be done for secu-
rity or convenience, depending on the service. The Service provider will be in 
control of the ePassport reader terminal which in some cases may include a  
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Fig. 2. Trusted identity management based on ePassport  
 
webcam for face recognition. This will avoid the need for creating private bio-
metric databases for authentication by private sector.  
(c) Low-value private services: A multitude of private service providers (e-shops, 
social networks) do not need to verify the precise and full identity of the user, 
rather only a partial identity yet still more than just the self-declared pseudonyms 
to have sufficient trust in the user. The trust level of the service provider is also a 
very important requirement. They may find it adequate for service provision to 
have, for instance, a pseudonym with a genuine age and password verified by an 
IdP who could ensure the pseudonymity and trust in the user at the same time. No 
biometric verification would be needed for such services even though the enrol-
ment with the IdP was based on ePassport and biometrics. 
With the three categories of use scenario above, it is technically feasible for a single 
IdP to serve all three types of service providers if the end-user so prefers whereas it is 
also feasible for a user to have more than one IdP. The IdPs will need to demonstrate 
their capability for privacy-enhancing features such as anonymization and unlinkabil-
ity to satisfy user demands and compete openly based on value-added benefits for 
trust, privacy, and risk minimization for the end users as well as the service providers. 
4.3   The Scheme - Two Remote Identification Schemes Binding to e-Passport 
Information 
A major question that arises in such a scheme is how to bind the passport to the holder 
in a remote environment. There are two emerging categories of technical implementa-
tions that we can distinguish in the literature for this type of services: 
Internet 
Connection 
Identity 
Database 
Identity 
Providers 
Secure Connection 
Encrypted & Signed 
User Service  Providers 
Face-to-Face 
Registration 
Government 
Services 
Service  
Databases 
High-value 
Services: 
Bank, 
Healthcare 
Low-value 
Services 
Internet 
Connection 
Kiosk
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(a) Direct model. Based on a trusted device concept, which can provide real-time 
identity verification directly using ePassport. This is particularly relevant for 
the eGov services based on multi-service kiosks. Figure 3 shows the commu-
nication between the user and the IdP in this scenario.  
 
 
Fig. 3. ePassport-based remote identity verification by the IdP 
 
(b) Indirect Model. The Identity Provider (IdP) supplies an e-security token 
(smart-card, certificate etc.). The IdP operates under regulations (national or in-
ternational). The token is provided after an enrolment phase based on the in-
formation that exists on the ePassport and may include additional information, 
the IdP may consider as generally required by the high-value service providers. 
The indirect model requires an enrolment phase where the client is providing his 
passport information to the IdP and in return he receives a customer card (smart-card) 
to which the e-passport information is tied to. Every time the client requests a service 
from a service provider (also referring as Relying Party) he uses his e-security token. 
In the smart card there is no passport information is stored only an identification 
number which is read during a transaction with a local smart card reader. For multi-
factor authentication, the user could also use a password in conjunction with the smart 
card to identify himself.  
On the other hand the direct model does not use an additional e-security token. 
Only the passport data is used for verification by face biometric. A futuristic imple-
mentation of the direct model may obviate the need for the use of an IdP where user 
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becomes his own IdP through the use of a certified personal trusted device which are 
sealed tamper-resistant mobile devices. These devices can be thought of as extended 
mobile devices (PDA, mobile phones) employed with a passport reader (even with 
biometric reader). However, they are not yet in the consumer market arena. 
There are two main risks regarding the above methods in common with any au-
thentication scheme based on possession and knowledge. This applies to both the 
direct and the indirect methods. 
1. An impostor could try to use the services in the name of the holder using the 
passport information.  
2. the holder could try to repudiate a genuine transaction claiming that an impostor 
used his online identity. 
Advancement in the security of real-time remote biometric verification could mini-
mize these risks. From the privacy requirements, the federated approach already ad-
mits unlinkability, pseudonyms and even anonymity if the service provider admits 
this property. 
5   Discussion 
An ensemble of citizen-life services in online world would require a trusted identity 
management infrastructure where identity of the end users can be trusted by the ser-
vice providers while at the same time the citizen could reasonably expect to have 
respect of privacy, along with support for partial identities and in some cases anonym-
ity. These requirements need to be satisfied simultaneously in a balanced manner.  
The electronic passport offers a globally interoperable trusted identity infrastruc-
ture for face-to-face border control applications. We have examined its feasibility to 
be used in the online world to provide trusted identity as an extension. This will re-
quire introduction of certain new features in a federated identity management system 
to bridge the gap between online and offline identities.  
There are several challenges that remain in the realm of research and technical ad-
vances continue to be made. It seems evident that the binding between the end user 
and the network-based enrolment and authentication processes is the key challenge 
for electronic identity management. The extent to which biometrics can be used for 
trusted remote authentication is fast becoming a reality and banking services are al-
ready running trials of such systems around the world. As more experience is gath-
ered in managing risks in such scenarios, routine deployment will follow. 
Another issue is about who should be in control of the authentication devices (ePass-
port reader, smart card readers etc)? Ideally, in a two-party transaction, both parties 
should be able to exert an equitable degree of control to maintain the required amount of 
trust in the transactional relationship. The kiosk environment is state of the art in offer-
ing self-services to citizens while ensuring trust as well as secure transaction.   
The schemes proposed in this paper are amenable to the adoption of privacy-
enhancing technologies by the identity providers as well as service providers. The 
framework allows the citizens to exert a value-based preference on the market offer-
ings in terms of convenience, security, privacy and trust thereby promoting innovation 
in identity management for online environment.  
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